(Download) "People State New York v. Thomas Rushlow" by Supreme Court of New York # eBook PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: People State New York v. Thomas Rushlow
- Author : Supreme Court of New York
- Release Date : January 25, 1983
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 69 KB
Description
Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from convictions after a jury trial of burglary, third degree, grand larceny, third degree, and criminal possession of stolen property, second degree, defendant argues that the testimony of two accomplices was not corroborated (see CPL 60.22) and that he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial (see CPL 30.30). We disagree. The accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of one Addley, not an accomplice in the offense charged or a related offense (see CPL 60.22, subd 2), that defendant recounted to him various details pertaining to the crime and to his participation therein; such admissions may provide the necessary corroboration to connect the defendant to the crime so as reasonably to satisfy the jury that the accomplices were telling the truth (see People v Ozarowski, 38 N.Y.2d 481, 488; see, generally, People v Glasper, 52 N.Y.2d 970, 971). We reject defendant's argument that because Addley was an accomplice of defendant in other unrelated crimes his testimony is unbelievable and is, therefore, as a matter of law, incapable of furnishing corroboration. The credibility of Addley's testimony and its sufficiency as corroboration were questions properly submitted to the jury (see, generally, People v Fiore, 12 N.Y.2d 188, 201-202). In denying defendant's CPL 30.30 motion, County Court found that defendant consented to and occasioned a period of delay in indicting him by attempting to negotiate a preindictment dismissal of the charges as part of a plea bargain disposing of other unrelated charges. Nowhere does defendant in an affidavit supporting the motion or on appeal take issue with this finding. Accordingly, that period was properly excluded from the time chargeable to the People, thus reducing the period of unexcused delay to less than 180 days (cf. People v McCafferey, 78 A.D.2d 1003; People v Wittmann, 73 A.D.2d 1053, 1054; People v Rivera, 72 A.D.2d 922, 923).